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I. INTRODUCTION

As others in this symposium have stated, Richard V. Wellman
devoted his professional life to promoting legislation to make the
law of estates and trusts responsive to the needs of a state's
citizenry. As he saw it, his goal to make the law of donative
transfers simpler, fairer, and less expensive depended upon new
legislative proposals accompanied by a range of strategies to educate
the bar and policymakers about them. Over the years, Dick's faith
in statutory lawmaking only grew, because estate planning experts
and legislators lauded the benefits achieved through enactment of
the uniform laws he either drafted or supported. Dick's genius was
twofold: He never glorified the past and always took the long view
of law reform. He welcomed new ways of thinking about an old
doctrine and appreciated that they would meet initial resistance
from many estates and trusts experts. He had confidence, however,
that over time, if those new approaches made the law simpler,
fairer, and more efficient, they would find acceptance. In honor of
the work of a man who, more than any other law professor,
practicing attorney, or legislator, influenced the modern law of
estates and trusts, we want to take this opportunity to explore the
reception of uniform law reform in the area of wealth succession
over the last forty years.
Our two-prong thesis theorizes Dick's approach to law reform.
First, we argue that uniform law proposals that ask courts and
practitioners to abandon revered legal traditions and ways of
thinking about estates and trusts, even when they are intentfurthering proposals, face resistance until, in time, the glories of the
past and the risks of a new legal regime fade in importance in legal
thought. Second, we argue that, especially within an environment
in which states seek to gain competitive advantage over each other,
the glories of the past and the risks of a new legal regime fade
fastest when a uniform law proposal limits the effect of intentdefeating rules.1 Uniform laws tend to fall into three categories: (1)

' See, e.g., Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors'Rights in Trusts, 53

HASTINGs L.J. 287, 287-88 (2002) (describing states' willingness to create asset-protection
trusts to attract out-of-state business); Robert T. Danforth, The Role of Federalism in
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statutes that usurp older statutory-based laws; (2) statutes,
typically remedial in nature, that reverse the common law; and (3)
statutes that predominantly codify the common law. We look at
examples of each to show how the interplay between revered legal
traditions and donative freedom affects the reception of uniform law
proposals. We also pay particular attention to intent-defeating
common law doctrines and the risks that uniform law drafters face
when they attempt to codify them in an environment where there is
stiff jurisdictional competition for estate planning business. This
analysis of the reception of uniform laws includes strategies to
assist the next generation of law reformers as they build on Richard
Wellman's legacy.

II. STATUTES REPLACING OLD STATUTORY LAWS: THE CASE OF
WILL EXECUTION REQUIREMENTS
Legislation authorizes the right to make a will and also
prescribes the formalities for will execution.2 Will execution
Administeringa NationalSystem of Taxation, 57 TAXLAW. 625,633 (2004) (stating that "[in
the last several years, numerous states have abolished their rules against perpetuities, in
many cases overtly for the purpose of attracting trust business from states that have retained
the rule" and indicating that "[tirust companies in these states promote the creation of socalled dynasty trusts"); Joel C. Dobris, The Deathofthe RuleAgainst Perpetuities,Or theRAP
Has No Friends-An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 605-06 (2000) (stating that
"local bankers and lawyers organize and lobby to gain an advantage" through particular
estate-planning laws); Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the PerpetualTrust,
50 UCLAL. REV. 1303, 1315-16 (2003) (discussing competition for perpetual trusts); Robert
H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, JurisdictionalCompetition for Trust Funds: An
EmpiricalAnalysis of Perpetuitiesand Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 360 n.4, 381-82, 381 n.76
(2005) (referring to arguments made by local law reformers and documenting their interest
in pursuing laws that would give them competitive advantage over their counterparts in other
states); Stewart E. Sterk, JurisdictionalCompetitiontoAbolish the Rule Against Perpetuities:
R.I.P. for the R.AP., 24 CARDOZO L. REv. 2097, 2097-98 (2003) (citing pressure from
"entrepreneurial lawyers" to enact trust-related legislation). See generally Larry E. Ribstein
& Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131
(1996) (considering jurisdictional competition in economic analysis of NCCUSL's activities).
Jesse Dukeminier and James Krier cited fear of lawyer malpractice liability as a
motivating force behind estates and trusts law reform. Dukeminier & Krier, supra,at 1310
n.26. We are skeptical of this theory. The 1990 UPC's harmless error rule (§ 2-503) and rule
concerning survivorship of trust beneficiaries (§ 2-707) are rules that estates and trusts
lawyers should support for exactly this reason, but in fact both provisions have encountered
resistance from the estate planning bar.
2 See, e.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942) (recognizing that "[rights
of succession to the property of a deceased, whether by will or by intestacy, are of statutory
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statutes have garnered considerable scholarly attention over the last
forty years because of a general unease about their intent-defeating
formalities.' Moreover, the growth of will substitutes, which have
enjoyed the benign neglect of state regulation regarding execution
formalities, makes the wills statutes' requirements appear both
excessively onerous and unnecessary.4 The Uniform Probate Code
(UPC), originally promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1969, had
considerably fewer requirements for the execution of attested wills
than most state statutes, which legislatures had modeled either on
the Statute of Frauds or the even more formality-stuffed English
Wills Act of 1837. Gone were the requirements that the witnesses
had to subscribe the will "in the presence" of the testator, that they
had to be "credible" (meaning that the witness or spouse of the
witness could not be a devisee of the will), that the testator had to
make or acknowledge his signature in the presence of the witnesses
all "present at the same time," and that the testator had to sign at
the "end" of the will. Instead, the UPC required only that two

creation, and the dead hand rules succession only by sufferance"); In re Will of Ferree, 848
A.2d 81,83 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2003), affd, 848 A.2d 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)
(stating that "the right to transfer property upon death, and the manner for effectively
making such a transfer, is subject to legislative control").
' See John H. Langbein, SubstantialCompliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV.
489, 531 (1975) (urging adoption of "substantial compliance doctrine" instead of "literal
compliance" doctrine).
" Many states require a writing for trusts in real property in accordance with the Statute
of Frauds of 1677. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 20 cmt. a (2003). A few states have
statutes that impose a writing requirement for lifetime trusts of personal property as well.
E.g., IND. CODE § 30-4-2-1(a) (2000); W. VA. CODE § 36-1-6 (2005); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §
737.111(1) (West 2005) (providing that Itihe testamentary aspects of a trust defined in
s. 731.201(34) [meaning provisions that dispose "of the trust property on or after the death
of the settlor"] are invalid unless the trust is executed by the grantor with the formalities
required for the execution of a will"); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 7-1.17(a) (McKinney 2002)
(requiring every lifetime trust to be in writing and "executed and acknowledged by the initial
creator and, unless such creator is the sole trustee, by at least one trustee thereof.., or, in
lieu thereof, executed in the presence of two witnesses who shall affix their signatures to the
trust instrument").
The neglect of statutory execution formalities for will substitutes may seem hard to
explain because will substitutes dispose ofvast amounts ofwealth. The absence ofprescribed
formalities for many of them probably owes at least something to the fact that they advance
the donative intentions of both less wealthy and wealthier individuals and that the private
parties have an interest in making sure that they have documented their arrangements well.
6 Statute of Frauds, 1677,29 Car. 2, c. 3 (Eng.); Wills Act, 1837,7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 26
(Eng.).

20061

FORTY YEARS OF CODIFICATION

1053

people "witness[ I either the signing or the testator's
acknowledgment of the signature or of the will" and that they sign
the will.' As the comments indicated, the drafters intended "to7
validate wills which meet the minimal formalities of the statute."
Without question, the 1969 UPC's will execution statute with its
"minimal formalities" has saved many wills that deserved being
saved. The case law, however, provides evidence of the difficulties
uniform law reformers have faced in their efforts to dislodge the
ritualized ceremony of will execution as a defining feature of wealth
succession law.8 For example, in the 1987 case of In re Estate of
Peters, when the witnesses signed the decedent's will after his
death, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to uphold the will
under the state's will execution statute, which had been modeled
after the 1969 UPC version of § 2-502.' Even though nothing in the
statutory language required the witnesses to sign before the
decedent's death, their post-death signatures breached the
ceremonial apparatus that distinguished wills from all other legal
documents in the minds of the justices. 10
The facts of the case make the court's insistence on adding
formalities to the state's will execution statute difficult to
understand, unless an analysis of the court's opinion takes into
account the justices' tenacious commitment to ritualism in willmaking. Conrad Peters died five days after his wife, Maria, leaving
6

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (1969).

The UPC's choice-of-law rule also furthered

validity by recognizing statutory will formalities of those states connected to the testator,
including the state where the testator executed the will, the state where the testator resided
at the time of execution, and the state where the testator resided at the time of death. Id. §
2-506.
7 Id. § 2-502 cmt.
8 Bar associations and legislatures are willing to support marginal incursions on the will
execution formalities, such as UPC (1990) § 2-513, which authorizes the disposition of
tangible personal property in an informally executed document. When first promulgated in
UPC (1969) § 2-513, this provision gained the attention of many estate bar associations and
legislatures and won widespread enactment. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILS AND

OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.9 statutory note (1999) (indicating that over half of states
have adopted either 1969 or 1990 version of UPC § 2-513). The fact that the 1969 version
authorized an unsigned handwritten document (which the 1990 version of the UPC no longer
permits) that could govern the disposition of a vast amount of wealth in the form of art and
antique collections did not dampen the enthusiasm of the legal community, presumably
because it left the will execution statute with its patina of formalism in place.
9 In re Estate of Peters, 526 A.2d 1005, 1014-15 (N.J. 1987).
'0 Id. at 1011.
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no heirs and survived only by his stepson." Marie and Conrad
Peters executed mutual wills more than a year before they both
died. She left all of her estate to him, and he left all of his estate to
her. At the death of the survivor, they both provided for Marie's son
(Conrad's stepson) to inherit all their property. 2 Sophia M. Gall, an
insurance agent, notary public, and Marie's sister-in-law prepared
the wills while Conrad was recovering in the hospital from a stroke,
which affected him physically but not mentally. 3 In the presence
of Marie and Sophia's husband (Marie's brother), Sophia read the
will to Conrad, who then agreed to its content and signed it. 4 When
two of Sophia's employees arrived at the hospital later in the
afternoon, Sophia reviewed the will again with Conrad, who, in the
presence of the two employees, indicated his approval of it and
acknowledged his signature. 5 Sophia signed the will at that time
as notary, but neither of the two employees signed the will as
witnesses." The state of New Jersey, which would succeed to
Conrad's estate if the court found his will invalid, challenged the
will's execution. 7 The trial court upheld the will's validity by
treating Sophia's signature as notary as a valid signature of a
witness and by allowing one of the other employees to sign the will.' 8
An intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling,
and the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed. 9
Conrad's stepson argued that "the elimination of the requirement
that the witness sign in the presence of the testator indicate[s) that
the Legislature intended that a witness could sign a will as a
subscribing witness at any time after the testator has signed or
acknowledged the will, even after the testator's death." ° He also
reasoned that "the lack of any other restrictions in the statute

"1 Id. at 1006.
12

Id. at 1007.

13 Id.
14

Id.

15 Id.
'a Id.

Id. at 1006.
s Id. at 1007.
19 In re Estate of Peters, 509 A.2d 797 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986), affd, 526 A.2d
1005 (N.J. 1987).
17

2

Peters, 526 A.2d at 1010.
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relating to when witnesses may sign a will" indicates that "the
procedure employed here was within the contemplation of the

statute."21 The supreme court used the Code's effort "to reduce the
number and refine the scope of those formalities" as a reason for
strictly construing the New Jersey statute modeled after it. 22 "[Ilt
is arguable that as the number of formalities have been reduced,
those retained by the Legislature have assumed even greater

importance, and demand at least the23
degree of scrupulous adherence
required under the former statute."

Strict construction for the court meant adding requirements not
otherwise in the statute.2' The Peterscourt erroneously viewed the
witnesses' acts of signing as a manifestation of their having
witnessed the testator's act of signing or the testator's act of
acknowledging the signature or the will. The witnesses' signatures,
however, do not necessarily indicate anything at all about the acts
they witnessed. Their signatures prove nothing one way or the
other. Under the then-existing New Jersey statute, the right
questions were: Is the witnesses' identification of the will possible

21

Id.

2 Id. at 1009.
23 Id. at 1010-11.
"'
The court seemed to adhere closely to the statute when it stated that the "current
statute ... clearly requires the fulfillment of [a witness's two] functions," which the court
called "observatory," consisting of the observation "of the testator's signature to or
acknowledgment of the will," and "signatory," which "consists of the signing of the will by the
persons who were witnesses." Id. The court went on to say that"Itihe signatory function may
not have the same substantive significance as the observatory function, but it is not simply
a ministerial or precatory requirement. While perhaps complementary to the observatory
function, it is nonetheless a necessary element of the witnessing requirement." Id. at 1011.
The court was correct in recognizing that the signatory act is not ministerial. The court
stated that the signatory act is "perhaps complementary to the observatory" act, but it did not
explore that point. If it had, it might have seen that the signature can complement the
observatory act only if it is a signature to an attestation clause that describes the execution
procedure followed. A mere signature on the will otherwise tells us nothing about the
observatory act. The court merely hinted at what other functions the signatory act serves by
referring to its significance as "an evidentiary requirement or probative element." Id. By
signing the document that Conrad acknowledged as his will, the witnesses would have
identified that document as the one that Conrad had intended as his will. It is that
evidentiary or probative element that was lost by the witnesses' failure to sign the document
at the time the acknowledgment took place.
For a similar judicial effort in which attention by a court to the ceremonial apparatus
of will execution leads it to add formalities to the state's will execution statute, see generally
Estate of McKellar, 380 So. 2d 1273 (Miss. 1980).
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if the signing occurs later, even after the testator's death? Does
their act of signing make them remember the events they witnessed
better? Even if it does (a debatable point), should this lead to denial
of the will in cases when the witnesses did not sign
contemporaneously or in close succession to the acts they observed?
The court never got to these questions because it could not imagine
construing New Jersey's will execution statute to validate a will in
which a witness signed after the testator's death where more than
eighteen months had passed between the acts the witness observed
and the witness's signature on the will.
The court's failure of imagination seems to have stemmed from
a preconceived image, or what cognitive psychologists refer to as a
schema, of what constitutes a will execution.25 The psychological
literature defines a schema as "a cognitive structure that represents
knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its
attributes and the relations among those attributes."26 The court's
will execution schema, i.e., those "attributes" it thought necessary
for a document to constitute a will, likely led it to find that Conrad
failed to execute a valid will. Given the incongruence between its
schema and the requirements of the state's will execution statute,
the court made only27 unconvincing attempts to justify its decision to
invalidate the will.

25 See SusAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 98-105 (2d ed. 1991)
(defining and giving examples of schemata); cf Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of
FiduciaryRelationships,85 CORNELL L. REv. 767, 768-69 (2000) (making similar argument
with regard to courts reviewing behavior of fiduciaries).
26 FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 98.
2
The traditional schema of will execution has also played a role in the courts' resistance
to the reduced formalities for unattested wills, which the 1969 UPC authorized. UNiF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (1969). The drafters of the UPC embraced unattested-also known
as holographic-wills in an effort to maximize the opportunity for a state to give effect to
written testamentary intentions. See id. at cmt. The early holographic will statutes required
that the will be entirely written, signed, and dated in the testator's handwriting, which led
many courts to hold holographic wills invalid. E.g., In re Bower's Estate, 78 P.2d 1012, 101415 (Cal. 1938), overruled by In re Baker's Estate, 381 P.2d 913, 916 (1963); In re Wolcott's
Estate, 180 P. 169, 171 (Utah 1919). UPC (1969) § 2-503 retained the signature requirement,
omitted the requirement of a date, and replaced the requirement that the will be "entirely"
in the testator's handwriting with the requirement that the "material provisions" be in the
testator's handwriting. Some courts interpreted "material provisions" strictly and denied
probate to wills because the handwriting alone did not demonstrate clear testamentary
intent. See, e.g., Estate of Johnson, 630 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (interpreting
statute modeled after UPC (1969) § 2-503); In re Estate of Foxley, 575 N.W.2d 150, 154 (Neb.
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None of us should underestimate the strength of the will
execution schema.28 Peters itself provides proof of its tenacity.
First, the facts in Peters would seem to cry out for a resolution that
would not leave Conrad's stepchild with no inheritance at all and
the state of New Jersey with the property of both his mother and
stepfather.29 Second, the court had to admit that its holding
invalidating the will meant that it had to add a requirement to the
will execution statute-namely, signatures by witnesses within a
reasonable time of their observation of the testator's signing or the
testator's acknowledgment of the signature or of the will:
We are thus satisfied that it would be unreasonable to
construe the statute as placing no time limit on the
requirement of obtaining two witnesses' signatures. By

1998) (same); In re Will of Ferree, 848 A.2d 81, 88 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2003), affd, 848
A.2d 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (same). But see Estate of Muder, 765 P.2d 997, 1000
(Ariz. 1988) (upholding will in which testator used preprinted form and filled in blanks with
his own handwriting, effectively reversingJohnson,supra);In re Estate of Gonzalez, 855 A.2d
1146, 1149-50 (Me. 2004) (upholding will on preprinted form when applying holographic will
statute modeled after UPC (1969) § 2-503). The Johnson, Foxley, and Ferreecourts misread
the statute by treating nonholographic material on a preprinted will form as part of the
material provisions of the holographic will. Their will execution schema for lholographic wills
did not correlate with the statutory requirements, but their schema prevailed, which meant
that they held the wills invalid. In response to cases like Johnson,UPC (1990) § 2-502(b) and
(c) require only that "the material portions of the document" need to be in the testator's
handwriting and that portions of the document that are not in the testator's handwriting,
along with other extrinsic evidence, can be used to establish testamentary intent. Fourteen
states have adopted either the 1969 or 1990 version of the UPC's holographic will statute.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.2 statutory note
(1999).
' Another possible example of the force of schemata in estates and trusts law reform has
to do with the 1997 Uniform Principal and Income Act and in particular the initial resistance
of trust experts to its equitable adjustment provision § 104(a). See Joel C. Dobris, Why
TrusteeInvestors Often PreferDividends to CapitalGainand Debt Investments to Equity-A
Daunting Principaland Income Problem, 32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 255, 257 n.2 (1997)
(citing "inelastic capacity of the human mind" as one explanation for this resistance).
' The facts surrounding the will execution by Conrad are a bit problematic regarding the
question of undue influence. He had suffered a stroke and his stepson's mother, aunt, and
uncle played crucial roles in assuring that Conrad executed a will that benefited his stepson
in the event Conrad survived his wife. In re Estate of Peters, 526 A.2d 1005, 1006-07 (N.J.
1987). Nevertheless, the state produced no evidence to suggest that the stepson or the
stepson's relatives engaged in fraud or exercised undue influence on Conrad, see id. at 1013
(noting "absence of any allegations of fraud"), and no facts appear in the opinion to suggest
why the stepson would not be an object of Conrad's bounty, especially since Conrad died
without any living blood relatives.
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implication, the statute requires that the signatures of
witnesses be affixed to a will within a reasonable period
30
of time from the execution of the will.
The court tied the "requirement of subscription within a
reasonable time" to the risk of fraud and undue influence.3 ' It used
the specter of fraud and undue influence as a justification for
retaining the will execution schema and made any challenge to that
schema a high risk proposition, i.e., the lack of a ritualized
ceremony may lead to the judicial error of validating a fraudulent
will or one which is the product of undue influence. The court, in its
effort to explain away the legislature's decision to reduce "the
number of execution formalities," emphasized the "significance of
the formalities it [the legislature] retained," but it assiduously
refused to address the legislature's interest in reducing the
incidences of judicial error in which valid wills are held invalid.3 2
Yet a third piece of evidence of the strength of the will execution
schema is that the court rejected the plaintiffs argument that it
"should validate the will in the absence of any allegation of fraud
because it was in 'substantial compliance' with the statute."3 3 The
court addressed the substantial compliance doctrine as set forth by
John H. Langbein in his influential article SubstantialCompliance
with the Wills Act. 34 After referring to a number of the criticisms
lodged against the doctrine by other scholars, the court rejected the
opportunity to apply it in this case.35 More than fifteen years after
30 Id. at 1011. NCCUSL ultimately enacted Peters'sreasonable-time rule when it revised
the 1969 UPC in 1990. UPC (1990) § 2-502(a)(3) now requires that an attested will be "signed
by at least two individuals, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after he [or she]
witnessed either the signing of the will... or the testator's acknowledgment of that signature
or acknowledgment of the will." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a)(3) (1990) (emphasis added).
Under the same facts as Peters, a court interpreting UPC (1990) § 2-502(a)(3) may not find
that a gap of eighteen months between the time an individual "witnessed" the testator's
signing of the will or the testator's acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgment of
the will is unreasonable. If the court looks to the purposes of the signature and finds that
they are met, then it may find that the will is valid. For a further discussion of the
reasonable-time requirement, see infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
31 Peters, 526 A.2d at 1011.
32 Id. at 1011-12.
3
Id. at 1013.
Id. (citing Langbein, supra note 3, at 521).
" In doing so, the court stated:
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Peters, some courts continue to reject the substantial compliance
doctrine and strictly apply, even if they do not add, will execution
requirements.3 6
Nevertheless, more than thirty-five years after the UPC began its
effort to dislodge the ritualized ceremony of will execution as a
defining feature of wealth succession law, case law provides
significant evidence that courts seek reasons to uphold wills and do
not give undue weight to the traditional ceremony reflected in
statutory will formalities. The fact that will proponents make
arguments based on the substantial compliance doctrine and that
the Peters court and others have had to address it show the
weakening hold of the traditional schema of will execution. Now,
even when courts hold wills invalid, the majority may express regret
at the result or signal to the legislature for authority to dispense
with the statutory requirements, or a dissenting judge may criticize
sharply the majority for its failure to adopt the substantial
compliance doctrine. More importantly, of course, is that courts
have upheld wills by applying the substantial compliance doctrine.3 8
To [adopt a substantial compliance doctrine] on the facts of this case
would, in our view, effectively vitiate the statutory requirement that
witnesses sign the will. We continue to believe that, as a general
proposition, strict, if not literal, adherence to statutory requirements is
required in order to validate a will, and that the statutory requirements
must be satisfied regardless of the possibility of fraud in any particular
case.

Id. at 1014 (footnote omitted). The court's rejection of the substantial compliance doctrine
comes as no surprise, given the court's earlier addition of a requirement to the will execution
statute. What is surprising, however, is how the will execution schema confused the court
into thinking that it was "strictly" adhering to the legislative language.
'3 E.g., In re Estate of Korth, No. E045346, 2005 WL 2600426, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct.
14, 2005) (unpublished decision); In re Estate of Iversen, 150 S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex. Ct. App.
2004); see also In re Will of Ferree, 848 A.2d 81, 90-91 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2003), affd,
848 A.2d 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (refusing to apply substantial compliance doctrine
to holographic wills).
" In re Estate of Phillips, No. 01-0879, 2002 WL 1447482, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 3,
2002) (unpublished opinion) (indicating that court needed statutory grant of authority); In re
Succession of Richardson, No. 2005 CA 0552, 2006 WL 741520, at *3 (La. Ct. App. Mar. 24,
2006) (stating reluctance to affirm lower court's decision holding notarial will invalid);
Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610, 613 (W. Va. 1998) (Workman, J., dissenting) (arguing
that majority "takes a very technocratic approach to the law, slavishly worshiping form over
substance").
' For a recent case applying the substantial compliance doctrine to avoid invalidity based
on a formality-filled will execution statute, see Fischerv. Kinzalow, 88 Ark. App. 307 (2004)
(upholding trial court's determination that testator substantially complied with requirement
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Four years after the Peters decision, the New Jersey Supreme
Court embraced the substantial compliance doctrine in Will of
Ranney."9 In that case, Russell G. Ranney executed his will under
the supervision of an attorney. By mistake, the two witnesses, one
the attorney's law partner and the other his secretary, signed the
self-proving affidavit rather than the will.40 Russell's wife Betty,
who received income interests in her husband's property for her life,
challenged the will because it failed to comply with New Jersey's
will execution statute.4 ' The court agreed that Russell had failed to
have his will validly executed, but went on to consider whether the
"will may be probated if it substantially complies" with the will
execution requirements. 2
By the time of this case, NCCUSL had embraced the harmless
error doctrine in UPC (1990) § 2-503, and the American Law
Institute (ALI) had embraced the substantial compliance doctrine. 3

of declaring her will to witnesses and requirement that testator request her witnesses to
sign). See also In re Estate of Tolin, 622 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1993), in which the Supreme Court
of Florida concluded that a constructive trust could be properly imposed to prevent unjust
enrichment because of a "mistake of fact which prevented the testator from" properly
revoking his codicil by physical act to the document. Id. at 990. The testator had been
advised by his neighbor, a retired attorney, that he could revoke his codicil by tearing up the
original. Id. at 989. The testator believed that when he tore up "the blue-backed photocopy"
he was tearing up the original of the will. Id. The court held that the testator had not
complied with the statutory requirements for revoking a will by physical act to the document,
but went on to allow for an equitable remedy. Id. at 991. Revocation by act to the document
lacks the solemnity associated with attested wills and, therefore, made it easier for the court
to excuse the mistake. Nevertheless, the willingness of the court to extend the remedy of
constructive trust to prevent unjust enrichment resulting from a mistake, rather than from
fraud or undue influence, is significant. Although the court does not embrace the language
of substantial compliance or harmless error in relation to the will revocation statute, that is
clearly the effect of its holding. 'See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (explaining
difference between substantial compliance and harmless error doctrines). Notably, UPC
(1990) § 2-503 does not address this type of case, because it applies only to documents not
executed in accordance with UPC (1990) § 2-502. It deals only with revocation to the extent
that the testator fails to meet the will execution requirements necessary to revoke a will or
a part of a will by subsequent instrument. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503(ii) (1990). But see
Allen v. Dalk, 826 So. 2d 245, 248 (Fla. 2002) (refusing to extend reasoning of Tolin where
testator failed to sign her will at her attorney's office because of oversight while signing at
same time her health care directive and durable power of attorney).
39 589 A.2d 1339 (N.J. 1991).
40

Id. at 1341.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 1343.

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (1990). The Restatement refers to the "harmless-error
rule," but embraces a substantial compliance rule in the absence of authorizing legislation.
43
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UPC (1990) § 2-503 authorizes a court to treat a document as if it
did meet the will execution requirements of UPC § 2-502 "if the
proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and
convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or
writing to constitute . . . the decedent's will."" Section 2-503's
harmless error rule differs from the substantial compliance doctrine
considered in Peters and Ranney and adopted by the ALI in two
important respects. First, it statutorily authorizes the court to
ignore a decedent's failure to meet the statutory will execution
requirements. In contrast, the substantial compliance doctrine
represents ajudicial gloss on the will execution statute. Second, the
harmless error rule asks the ultimate question of whether the
decedent intended the document to be his or her will, whereas the
substantial compliance doctrine requires a court to ask whether the
decedent had substantially complied with a particular will execution
requirement.4 5 The NCCUSL and ALI developments influenced the
Ranney court and led it to conclude that "courts and scholars have
determined that substantial compliance better serves the goals of
statutory formalities by permitting probate of formally-defective
wills that nevertheless represent the intent of the testator."4
As compared to the Peters court, the Ranney court engaged in a
more thorough analysis of the legislative history concerning New
Jersey's will execution statute. It noted that the legislature had not
only reduced the will execution formalities for attested wills, but
also enacted a provision that allowed unwitnessed holographic wills

It states that
the court should apply a rule of substantial compliance, under which a will
is found validly executed if the document was executed in substantial
compliance with the statutory formalities and if the proponent establishes
by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document
to constitute his or her will.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 33.1 cmt. g (1992).
" The statute also permits the proponent to establish that a document or writing
constitutes a partial or complete revocation of the will, an addition to or alteration of the will,
or a partial or complete revival of a formerly revoked will or of a formerly revoked portion of
the will. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503(ii)-(iv) (1990).
4
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 (1999)

embraces the harmless error language in recognition of the legislative trend.
4 Ranney, 589 A.2d at 1343-44.
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to be admitted to probate. 47 Although it concluded that the
"approval of unwitnessed holographic wills, like the diminution of
attestation requirements, reflects a more relaxed attitude toward
the execution of wills" and that the legislature intended "to free will
execution from the ritualism of the pre-Code law and to prevent
technical defects from invalidating otherwise valid wills," it
nevertheless reinforced the formalism in New Jersey's will execution
procedure." As it upheld the will, notwithstanding the witnesses'
failure to sign the will itself, the court stated:
The execution of a last will and testament ... remains

a solemn event. A careful practitioner will still observe
the formalities surrounding the execution ofwills. When
formal defects occur, proponents should prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the will substantially
complies with statutory requirements.... Our adoption
of the doctrine of substantial compliance should not be
construed as an invitation either to carelessness or
chicanery. The purpose of the doctrine is to remove
procedural peccadillos as a bar to probate.49
Arguably, the facts in Ranney did not challenge the court's
schema of what constitutes a good will execution procedure. After
all, the procedure met the ceremonial expectations typically
associated with traditional will executions, except for the fact that
the witnesses signed the wrong legal document. Notwithstanding
the narrowness of the holding, however, the court felt obliged to
reinforce its commitment to maintaining "a solemn event" and to
disabuse anyone from thinking that they should not continue to
exercise care when executing or supervising the execution of a will.5 °
47

Id. at 1345.

48Id.
"

Id. (citation omitted).

See In re Will of Ferree, 848 A.2d 81, 89-90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2003), affd, 848
A.2d 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (relying on narrowness of Ranney decision as basis for
refusing to apply substantial compliance to holographic will). UPC (1990) § 2-504(c) bolsters
the view that Ranney reinforced, rather than dislodged, the will execution schema. It
provides that a "signature affixed to a self-proving affidavit attached to a will is considered
a signature affixed to the will, if necessary to prove the will's due execution." UNIF. PROBATE
'0
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In 2004, the New Jersey legislature went a long way in
disrupting the schema of will execution when it enacted a statute
modeled after the UPC (1990)'s harmless error rule.51 In In re
Estate of Denner,the Superior Court of New Jersey denied a motion
to dismiss a request, in accordance with the harmless error statute,
to admit into probate as the decedent's will three alternative
documents, none of which the decedent had signed. 2 After
considering the comments to UPC (1990) § 2-503 and Langbein's
article Excusing HarmlessErrorsin the Execution of Wills: A Report
on Australia's Tranquil Revolution in ProbateLaw,53 it refused to
adopt a per se rule to require a signature in all cases.54 Denner

CODE § 2-504(c) (1990). This subsection eliminates the need for proponents to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document to be his or her will,
notwithstanding that the witness or witnesses failed to sign the will. Instead, it
automatically treats a signature on the self-proving affidavit as sufficient for purposes of UPC
(1990) § 2-502.
6' 2004 N.J. Laws ch. 132, § 10, ch. 160, § 3 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West
Supp. 2005) and effective Feb. 27, 2005).
Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, Montana, South Dakota, and Utah also have adopted
statutes modeled on UPC (1990) § 2-503. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-503 (West 2004)
(deviating from UPC (1990) § 2-503 by omitting clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv)); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 560:2-503 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 700.2503 (West 2002);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-503 (2004); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-503 (Supp. 2005). Early judicial interpretations of UPC (1990) § 2-503 were
troubling. In the first appellate decision under UPC (1990) § 2-503, In re Estate of Brooks,
927 P.2d 1024, 1027-28 (Mont. 1996), the court relied on the Montana statute modeled after
it to hold that the proponents of a document had the burden to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the testator had the requisite mental capacity to execute a will. The dissent
in In re Estate of Kuralt, 981 P.2d 771, 778 (Mont. 1999) (Turnage, J., dissenting), adopted
similar reasoning regarding the question oftestamentary intent. Both Brooks and the dissent
in Kuralt fail to appreciate that the harmless error statute applies only to formal and not
substantive will requirements. A proponent of a will should only have to prove intent,
testamentary capacity, and freedom from undue influence and fraud by a preponderance of
the evidence. Subsequent decisions applying statutes modeled on UPC (1990) § 2-503,
however, have appropriately applied the statute to determine if a testator intended that a
document, which fails to meet the will execution formalities, constitutes that testator's will.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Sky Dancer, 13 P.3d 1231, 1234 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (denying
probate to proffered document); In re Estate of Hall, 51 P.3d 1134, 1136 (Mont. 2002)
(upholding proffered document as will); In re Estate of Denner, No. 0-3474,2006 WL 510530,
at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Feb. 28, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (distinguishing Estate of
Sky Dancer and denying defendant's motion to dismiss claim that three unexecuted
documents be admitted to probate as decedent's will).
52 Denner, 2006 WL 510530, at *4.
53 John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errorsin the Execution of Wills: A Report on
Australia's TranquilRevolution in ProbateLaw, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1987).
5
2006 WL 510530, at *2-3.
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seems to provide clear evidence that, after thirty-five years, the
schema of will execution no longer prevents courts from asking the
ultimate question: Did the decedent intend this document to be his
or her will?
The California appellate court case of In re Estate of Sauressig
presents an appropriate coda to New Jersey's experience with will
formalities. On facts similar to Peters, the court held a will valid
under a will execution statute that was modeled after UPC (1969)
§ 2-502."5 In Sauressig,the testator died about twenty months after
he executed his will, which was signed by only one witness.5 6 The
court held that the requirements of the statute were met because a
second witness to the execution was available to testify to the
execution.5 7 It reasoned that the legislature intended to "relax
formalities" when it based its statute on UPC (1969) § 2-502. 5 1 It
then went on to quote UPC (1990) § 2-502(a)(3), which adopts
Peters's reasonable-time rule, and the comments to it. 5 9 Without
acknowledging that the will execution statute in UPC (1990)
imposed a new formality-signature by the witnesses within a
reasonable time-the court emphasized the commentary stating
that "[t ]here is... no requirement that the witnesses sign before the
testator's death."6 0 It went on to conclude that there was "nothing
in the language" of California's will execution statute "or in its
inspiration [UPC (1969) § 2-502] . . . to preclude an otherwise
qualified witness from signing a will after the death of the
testator."6 Once the Sauressig court assured itself that "[niothing
in these undisputed facts indicates fraud in the execution of the
will" and, therefore, that the purpose of the requirement of two
subscribing witnesses was "adequately satisfied ... despite the fact
that only one of the two individuals who witnessed the execution of

' In re Estate of Sauressig, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262, 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004),petitionfor rev.
granted, 102 P.3d 903 (Cal. 2004); see also Estate of Eugene, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 622, 623, 625
(Ct. App. 2002) (validating will executed more than eight years before testator died, even
though one witness did not sign will until after testator's death).
56 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 263.
57 Id. at 267.
58 Id. at 265.
59 Id.

60 Id.
61 Id.
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the will signed it before the testator's death," it held the will valid. 2
Sauressig stands in stark contrast to Peters. Richard Wellman
taught us that the passage of time surely helped courts and
legislatures to see the benefits of a statute with fewer formalities
accompanied by a harmless error statute, but that alone probably
was insufficient. It also required the persistent efforts of Richard
Wellman, assisted greatly by the work of John Langbein and
Lawrence Waggoner, to succeed in making courts and legislatures
less comfortable with will execution rituals and more attentive to
testamentary intent.63
III. REMEDIAL STATUTES OVERRIDING THE COMMON LAW:

THE CASE OF UPC (1990) § 2-707
As we have already noted, one major goal of the UPC is to reduce
the discrepancies between estate plans executed by those who have
the benefit of skilled estate planning attorneys and plans executed
by those that have not had that benefit. Usually through some
inadvertent misstep of unskilled attorneys or property owners
themselves, those owners fail to accomplish their donative intent.
The UPC relies primarily on remedial statutes in its effort to assist
ill-advised or unadvised property owners. These statutes apply
unless evidence, including language in the document and also other
circumstances, indicates that the donor had a contrary intent.
Frequently a remedial statute of the UPC overrides the results
produced by a common law rule, typically a rule of construction,
such as is the case with UPC (1990) § 2-707. This provision rejects,
as to future interests created in trusts, the traditional common law
constructional norm that beneficiaries of future interests are not
required to survive until the time of distribution.' Instead, it
62 Id. at 267. Sauressigraises the question of whether a twenty-month time gap between
the time testator signed the will and he died would satisfy the reasonable-time requirement
now imposed by UPC (1990) § 2-502(a)(3). Its validity under the 1990 UPC may require
application of the harmless error rule of § 2-503.
6' Lawrence Waggoner was Reporter for the 1990 UPC and for the Restatement (Third)
ofProperty: Wills andOtherDonative Transfers. John Langbein was Associate Reporter with
Waggoner on the Restatement, and his scholarly contribution on will formalities is
unmatched by any other scholar. See Langbein, supra note 53; Langbein, supra note 3.
" E.g., In re Ferry's Estate, 361 P.2d 900, 904-05 (Cal. 1961); Rosenthal v. First Nat'l
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presumptively imposes a survivorship requirement on all future
interests held in trust and creates substitute gifts in the
predeceased beneficiary's descendants who survive to the time of
distribution. If no descendants survive, the statute provides for
alternative substitute gifts to persons alive at the time of
distribution, who, depending on the nature of the trust, may be the
residuary takers named in the settlor's will or their lineal
descendants, or the heirs of the settlor as determined at the time of
distribution. 5 After its promulgation in 1990, UPC § 2-707
provoked debate.6 6

Bank, 239 N.E.2d 826, 829 (Ill. 1968); In re Bogart's Will, 308 N.Y.S.2d 594, 594 (N.Y. Sur.
Ct. 1970); White v. Alexander, 224 S.E.2d 617, 620-21 (N.C. 1976); Peters v. Allison, 814
N.E.2d 568, 571 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); In re Bomberger's Estate, 32 A.2d 729, 730-31 (Pa.
1943); RESTATEMENT(FIRST)OF PROP. § 261 (1940). ContraRushing v. Mann, 910 S.W.2d 672,

674 (Ark. 1995); Lawson v. Lawson, 148 S.E.2d 546, 546-57 (N.C. 1966) (appearing to be
superceded by White, supra, although White does not make any reference to Lawson); Jones
v. Holland, 77 S.E.2d 202, 204 (S.C. 1953).
65 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-707(d), -711 (1990). UPC (1990) § 2-707(e) provides for a
comparable set of substitute gifts for future interests created by the exercise of a power of
appointment.
" States that have enacted most of the 1990 revisions to Article 2 have adopted UPC
(1990) § 2-707. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.707 (2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-707 (2004);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-707 (Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-717 (2005); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 45-2-707 (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-07 (1996); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 29A-2-707 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-707 (Supp. 2005).
A statutory rule of construction that imposes a survivorship condition on future
interests is not unique to the UPC. Pennsylvania and Tennessee have statutes that impose
a survivorship requirement on class gifts. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2514(5) (West 2005);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-3-104 (West 2005). Illinois imposes a survivorship requirement on
future interests created by will given to the testator's descendants. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/411 (1992). Iowa has a statute that imposes a survivorship requirement on all future interests
in trust, but with numerous exceptions. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633A.4701 (West Supp. 2006).
For arguments in favor of UPC (1990) § 2-707, see generally Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform
Acts, Restatements and Trends in American Trust Law at Century's End, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1877
(2000); Edward C. Halbach, Jr. & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC'sNew Survivorship and
Antilapse Provisions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1091 (1992); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform
Probate Code Extends Antilapse-Type Protection to Poorly Drafted Trusts, 94 MICH. L. REV.
2309 (1996). For criticisms of UPC (1990) § 2-707, see generally David M. Becker, Eroding
the Common Law Paradigmfor Creation of PropertyInterests and the Hidden Costs of Law
Reform, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 773 (2005); David M. Becker, Uniform Probate Code Section 2-707
and the ExperiencedEstatePlanner: UnexpectedDisastersand How to Avoid Them, 47 UCLA
L. REV. 339 (1999) [hereinafter Becker, ExperiencedEstatePlanner];Laura E. Cunningham,
The Hazards of Tinkering with the Common Law of Future Interests: The California
Experience, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 667 (1997); Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Probate Code
Upends the Law of Remainders, 94 MICH. L. REv. 148 (1995).
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Proponents of the statute appreciated the difficulties they would
face in convincing estates and trusts experts that § 2-707 was an
intent-furthering provision. Waggoner, as Reporter for the 1990
UPC, in particular understood that the common law's constructional
rule against implying a condition of survivorship until the time of
distribution had strong support and was not viewed as an intentdefeating rule. He tried to blunt the resistance to abandoning the
common law tradition by showing how "[momentum has long been
building for a statute like section 2-707. 67 He argued that to the
extent the common law rule of destructibility of contingent
remainders and the common law Rule Against Perpetuities (the
RAP or the Rule) justified the preference for early vesting, the
abolition of the former and the liberalization of the latter have made
the preference unnecessary.6" He showed, moreover, how future
interests not subject to a survivorship condition increased the costs
of transmission in a world of state and federal transfer taxes and
probate administration.6 9
Finally, he relied on the early
commentaries and the Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative
Transfers, both of which critiqued the preference for early vesting,
to persuade skeptics that UPC (1990) § 2-707 was doing no more
than what others had been saying should be done for many
decades.7"
These arguments, however, have not overcome the resistance of
some experts in the area of estates and trusts to the reversal of the
familiar common law rule of early vesting. Beyond the "persistent
celebration of the common law,"7 1 which the title of Jesse
Dukeminier's attack on UPC § 2-707-"The Uniform Probate Code
Upends the Law of Remainders"-makes palpable,7 2 this statutory

Waggoner, supra note 66, at 2321.
Id. at 2321-22.
9 Id. at 2322.
70 Id. at 2322-25 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 27.3
cmt. a, b, e, i (1988); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., IssuesAbout Issue: Some Recurrent Class Gift
Problems, 48 Mo. L. REV. 333, 367 n.142 (1983); Edward H. Rabin, The Law Favors the
Vesting of Estates. Why?, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 467,487,479,483-84(1965); Daniel M. Schuyler,
Drafting,Tax, and Other Consequences of the Rule ofEarly Vesting, 46 ILL. L. REv. 407, 42729, 441 (1951)).
7
Frederick Schauer, The Failureof the Common Law, 36 ARiz. ST. L.J. 765, 765 (2004).
7'2 Dukeminier, supra note 66.
67
6
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reform was asking estate planners to accept the proposition that the
literal language in the documents that they draft would not control
the disposition of their clients' property. David M. Becker, a critic
of UPC (1990) § 2-707, probably expresses the anxieties of many
planners when he writes:
[E]xperienced lawyers must recognize that saying what
they mean may not be enough to overcome § 2-707 and,
therefore, enough to mean what they say... [and] that
§ 2-707's departure from the common law default
system-a system that requires positive statements for
the creation of interests and conditions-is profound and
consequently problematic. Because under § 2-707 the
platform from which lawyers draft trusts is no longer a
blank slate but is instead one encumbered by statutorily
implied interests and conditions, the logic and
techniques used for drafting are radically changed to a
system that requires one to know whether, when, and
how to subtract carefully before one can begin the
process of adding.7 3
Becker essentially equates the common law's constructional
preference with legal logic itself. He attaches little or no weight to
the argument that, as a default rule, UPC (1990) § 2-707 furthers
the probable donative intent of the ill-advised or unadvised settlor.
Instead, Becker's overriding concern is that when lawyers say"what
"
they mean," that may not be "enough to mean what they say. 71

" Becker, Experienced Estate Planner,supranote 66, at 348.

74 Arguments against UPC (1990) § 2-707 that honor lawyers' express language typically

ignore the fact that courts have not consistently applied the traditional common law
constructional norm regarding survivorship conditions on future interests. See, e.g., Lawson
v. Lawson, 148 S.E.2d 546, 457 (N.C. 1966) (imposing condition of survivorship on future
interest subject to condition unrelated to survivorship); In re Button's Estate, 490 P.2d 731,
734 (Wash. 1971) (imposing condition of survivorship on remainder that followed life estate
in settlor of revocable lifetime trust and then providing substitute takers for interest by
applying state's antilapse statute, which by its terms only applied to devisees of wills). Also,
courts have construed a remainder interest to a single-generation class (e.g., children) to
mean issue. The effect of this construction is to impose a condition of survivorship until the
time of distribution and provide a substitute gift to the lineal descendants of the predeceased
class member. See, e.g., Edwards v. Bender, 25 So. 1010, 1012 (Ala. 1899); Cox v. Forristall,
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UPC (1990) § 2-707 also challenged estate planners in its
complexity. 75 The variety of factual situations that can arise leads
to an intricate statute. Its virtue is that it provides a clear and
appropriate result to any case that arises. Its vice is that it leaves
estates and trusts specialists skeptical that the problem demands
such an intricate solution. Section 2-707 reflects the modern trend
76
that Frederick Schauer has recently described as "precisification."
This trend is one in which a "highly precise canonical statement of
the law much more often associated with the civil law" is
substituted for the common law, which places the judge at the

640 P.2d 878, 884 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 14.1 cmt. g(1)-(4), 15.4 cmt. h (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004)
(discussing situations that warrant court's construing term "children" to mean "issue");
Waggoner, supra note 66, at 2318-21 (discussing Edwards and Cox cases within context of
UPC (1990) § 2-707).
The drafters of UPC (1990) § 2-707, of course, contemplated that a settlor may not
want the results provided under this section. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707 cmt. (1990).
The issue arises as to how best to accomplish the settlor's intent. Professor Becker suggests
that an estate planner might use the following provision:
This trust fully disclaims and rejects all rules of construction expressed
and imposed by Section (herein include the precise citation to the local
statutory equivalent of § 2-707). This disclaimer includes, but is not
limited to, the statutory requirement of survivorship to the time for
distribution for all beneficiaries of future interests and the statutory
substitute gift to the living descendants of beneficiaries who fail to satisfy
such condition of survivorship.
Becker, ExperiencedEstate Planner,supra note 66, at 407. In our view, this is not a useful
way of opting out of § 2-707. A boilerplate clause that refers to a statute and says that the
statute is rejected does not inform a client of its import. Some clients may be prompted to ask
what that clause is about and some would not. Even those who ask might be given an answer
such as "Oh, that's just a technical provision we put in all of our trusts." More useful to the
client is a clause that gives the client clear notice of its significance. Thus, rather than
drafting a future interest "to A's children," following an interest in A for A's life and then
inserting Becker's boilerplate language, we think clients are better served by a clause that
says "To A's children whether or not any of A's children predeceases A and not to descendants
of any of A's children who predecease A." The client is much more likely to understand the
legal effect of this clause than they would Becker's boilerplate clause. For further discussion
of effect opting-out language having to do with antilapse statutes, see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILlS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.5 cmt. i (1999); Halbach &
Waggoner, supra note 66, at 1102-04.
" See, e.g., Becker, Experienced Estate Planner,supra note 66, at 348-68 (noting that "§
2-707 requires careful attention and study"); Dukeminier, supra note 66, at 156 (noting
"complexities and convolutions" of § 2-707); see also Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform
ProbateCode: Older and Better, or More Like the InternalRevenue Code?, 77 MINN. L. REV.
639, 642 (1993) (criticizing complexities found in 1990 version of UPC, including its antilapse
provision (§ 2-603), which has many similarities to UPC (1990) § 2-707).
7
Schauer, supra note 71, at 768.
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center of the "lawmaking process."7 7 Precisification may make § 2707's reversal of the common law preference for vesting more
difficult to embrace. If the drafters of UPC (1990) § 2-707 had
established broadly worded substantive directives that would have
allowed judges to shape a solution that corresponded to the specific
estate plan before it, the reversal of the preference for vesting and
the provision for substitute takers may have had a better reception.
As we saw earlier, however, UPC (1990) § 2-503's harmless error
standard has taken a long time to overcome the formalistic tradition
associated with wills. Adoption of a substantive directive for the
treatment of future interests in trusts probably would not have
enjoyed a better reception than the current UPC (1990) § 2-707.
UPC drafters probably would continue to face difficulties
overcoming the primacy that estates and trusts experts traditionally
have accorded to language found in governing instruments.
The ultimate success of the UPC (1990) § 2-707's drafters to
convince reluctant state bar associations that they are understating
the harms caused by the common law tradition while overstating
the risks of a new legal regime remains unclear. Since its
promulgation, the Restatement (Third)of Property: Wills and Other
Donative Transfers retained the common law rule of construction in
its discussion of future interests involving class gifts, "because it is
the rule best suited within the confines of the common-law tradition
to approximate the likely preference of the transferor."78 Which is
to say, it comes closest to approximating "the likely preference of the
transferor" not to "disinherit a line of descent."7 9 This development
should not be viewed as a setback for a statutory rule that would
impose a condition of survivorship on all future interests in trust
and provide substitute takers. On the contrary, the commentary
supports legislative action in this area. As the commentary
recognizes, "[Mt would probably be within the traditional technique
of the common law to construe single-generation class gifts as
presumptively being subject to an implied condition of survival of

77 Id. at 765.
78 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 15.4 cmt. c

(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004).
79 Id.
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the distribution date.""° It also recognizes, however, that "[ulnless
a court is willing to couple a survival requirement with a blanket
presumption creating a substitute gift to the descendants of a
deceased class member, merely implying a condition of survival in
all cases would extinguish the possibility of benefit to the deceased
class member's descendants."" The commentary further states that
a "rule better suited to the transferor's purposes would recognize not
only an implied condition of survival, but also an implied substitute
gift to the descendants of a deceased class member who survive the
distribution date." 2 It is too early to know whether legislatures will
give considerable weight to the ALI's endorsement of a statute
modeled after UPC (1990) § 2-707. What we do know from the
difficulties uniform law reformers faced when they tried to dislodge
the traditional schema for will execution is that fifteen years is too
short a time to judge the success of a statute that challenges estates
and trusts lawyers' views about the sanctity of language in
governing instruments.
IV. CODIFICATION AND MODIFICATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE
UNIFORM TRUST CODE AND THE UNIFORM STATUTORY RULE

AGAINST PERPETUITIES
Up to now in the discussion of law reform we have discussed
uniform laws that challenge traditional understanding of estates
and trusts law for the purpose of furthering donative intent,
especially for those who do not have the benefit of able legal advice.
In this part of the Essay we want to focus on the challenges facing
law reformers when they codify common law rules that limit
donative freedom. During the last twenty years, NCCUSL has
promulgated two significant codifications of the common law in the
area of estates and trusts-the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) and the
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP). The UTC
provides us the opportunity to look at a codification that is likely to
curb further legal developments. Specifically, we contrast the UTC's

80

Id. at cmt. e.

81 Id.
82

Id. at cmt. c.
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codification of the spendthrift trust doctrine and the exceptions to
it with USRAP's modification of the Rule Against Perpetuities. The
UTC virtually codifies the common law's spendthrift trust doctrine
and its exceptions.83 In contrast, USRAP preserves the core of the
RAP, but also makes a significant modification." If a disposition
violates the RAP, USRAP adopts a ninety-year wait-and-see
period.85 At that time, if any interests have not yet vested or failed,
USRAP authorizes the courts to reform the disposition "in the
manner that most closely approximates the transferor's manifested
plan of distribution and is within the 90 years allowed."86 When
promulgated in 1986, USRAP enjoyed great success early, but, in
more recent years, a significant number of legislatures have
abolished the common law Rule altogether.87 We explore the
reasons for this volatile history. The comparison of the codification
of the exceptions to the spendthrift trust doctrine and the RAP puts
into sharp relief the risks involved when law reformers propose
statutory solutions for intent-defeating common law rules.
A. CODIFICATION OF THE SPENDTHRIFT TRUST DOCTRINE

UTC § 502 embraces BroadwayNational Bank v. Adams, which
established the primacy of the settlor's power over the rights of the
beneficiary of a trust.88
The founder of this trust was the absolute owner of his
property ....
His intentions ought to be carried out,
unless they are against public policy....

It is argued that investing a man with apparent
wealth tends to mislead creditors, and to induce them to
give him credit. The answer is, that creditors have no

83

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502, 503 (amended 2005).

84

'

UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 8B U.L.A. 321 (1990).
Id. § 1(a)(2), (b)(2), (c)(2).

86

Id. § 3.

s7 See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
' Broadway Natl Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 174 (1882). For a discussion of how
the idea of freedom of disposition creates a "dead hand dilemma" because it can be invoked
by both the settlor and the beneficiary, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the
Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1193 (1985).
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right to rely upon property thus held, and to give him
credit upon the basis of an estate which, by the
instrument creating it, is declared to be inalienable by
him, and not liable for his debts....
The rule of public policy which subjects a debtor's
property to the payment of his debts, does not subject
the property of a donor to the debts of his beneficiary,
and does not give the creditor a right to complain that,
in the exercise of his absolute right of disposition, the
donor has not seen fit to give the property to the
creditor, but has left it out of his reach. 9
Notwithstanding flaws in the court's reasoning, the spendthrift
trust doctrine has generally flourished in the United States, and the
UTC provision follows the lead of a great number of states that have
codified Broadway National Bank. ° Given the common law
tradition to promote donative freedom and the widespread
popularity of the spendthrift trust doctrine itself, the difficult
question facing the UTC drafters was not whether to follow
Broadway NationalBank, but what, if any, limits they should place
on the doctrine.
UTC § 503 sets out the four traditional common law exceptions
to the rule that a settlor can prevent creditors from reaching the
interests of a trust beneficiary. The following creditors can reach an
interest held in trust: the beneficiary's child for support, the
beneficiary's spouse or former spouse for support, a judgment
creditor who has provided services for the protection of the
beneficiary's interest in the trust, and claims of the state or of the
United States to the extent the state or the United States

89 Broadway Nat'l Bank, 133 Mass. at 173-74.
9o For a state-by-state compilation, see 2AAUSTINW. SCOTT, THE LAw OF TRusTs § 152.1
(William F. Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1987 & Supp. 2003). For criticism and policy discussions of
the spendthrift trust doctrine, see generally JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE
ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (1883); JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF
PROPERTY (2d ed. 1895); ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (2d ed. 1947); Mary

Louise Fellows, Spendthrift Trusts: Roots and Relevance for Twenty-First Century Planning,
50 REC. ASSN. B. CITY N.Y. 140 (1995); Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts andPublic Policy:

Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1995).
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statutorily authorizes.9 ' As Edward C. Halbach, Jr., the Reporter
for the Restatement (Third)of Trusts, observes about this traditional
list of preferred creditors, "lengthy and vigorous debates in the last
few years have eventually led to no significant changes or trends in
rules identifying privileged claimants who can penetrate the
92
spendthrift shield."

The most
beneficiary.
that the law
like spouses
"exercise

. .

obvious omission from the list are tort creditors of a
Broadway National Bank's own reasoning suggests
should make an exception for tort creditors because,
and children, they do not have the opportunity to

. proper diligence ...

[and] ascertain the nature and

estate.9"

extent of" a beneficiary's
The UTC drafting committee
debated this issue and ultimately decided not to include tort
creditors in the list of preferred creditors.'
With Broadway
National Bank as a starting point, the question that appears
appropriate is how much can the law protect the power of settlors
to control their property without violating public policy. The
question that appears inappropriate is how much should the law
further public policy by protecting the creditors of beneficiaries from
restraints on alienation placed on the trust interests owned by the
beneficiaries.
UTC §§ 502 and 503 clarify the common law spendthrift trust
doctrine and its exceptions. 95 To use Carol Rose's term, these
provisions crystallize the law. 96 Crystallization, however, can have
two effects. First, it can provide a roadmap for further statutory
changes. Alternatively, it can lead to an ossification of the common
law and prevent any further development.97 With respect to UTC §§

91 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503
9

(amended 2005).

Halbach, supra note 66, at 1894.

' BroadwayNat'l Bank, 133 Mass. at 173; see also SCOTT, supranote 90, § 157.5, at 220
(observing that "[a] man who is about to be knocked down by an automobile has no
opportunity to investigate the credit of the driver of the automobile and has no opportunity
to avoid being injured no matter what the resources of the driver may be").
94 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 cmt. (amended 2005).
95 Id. §§ 502, 503.
96 Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in PropertyLaw, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 577 (1988).
97 In GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982), the author
argues that the "statutorification" of American law ultimately leads to obsolescent statutes
and proposes a "judicial common law review of statutes" in response to that obsolescence. Id.
at 1-7, 81-90. We argue that, although ossification of the law can occur, codification also can
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502 and 503, crystallization probably will not lead to an expansion
of the exceptions to the spendthrift trust doctrine. At best, it will
lead legislatures simply to adhere to § 503's limited list of preferred
creditors. Even more troubling is that a crystallized codification of
the list of preferred creditors probably will prevent judicial
development of further exceptions, such as tort creditors, to the
common law's spendthrift trust doctrine.9 8 It may even lead some
legislatures to eliminate preferred status for one or more of the
classes of creditors currently on the list.
The drafting committee could have pursued three different
approaches to the issue of preferred creditors. First, it could have
decided not to codify the spendthrift trust doctrine and left it to
common law development. The committee did this with respect to
the common law development of the secret trust doctrine, which
concerns the remedy available to a beneficiary when a trustee
breaches a promise to carry out the terms of a trust that fails to
meet the formality requirements of the Statute of Frauds or the
Statute of Wills.9 9 Second, it could have included tort creditors on
the list of preferred creditors. This choice would have met
considerable resistance from bankers and trust attorneys. 10 0 In any

lead to yet further statutory change. The consequences of any particular codification depend
on the relationship of the legal rule to the area of law in which it operates. In the area of
estates and trusts, the high regard for donative freedom and jurisdictional competition for
estate planning business may lead to further modifications and sometimes even abolition of
intent-defeating statutes.
" See Scheffel v. Krueger, 782 A.2d 410, 412 (N.H. 2001) (holding that statutory rule
precluded adoption of tort creditors exception); see also Duvall v. McGee, 826 A.2d 416, 430
(Md. 2003) (rejecting adoption of tort creditor exception to state's court-created spendthrift
doctrine). Sligh v. FirstNat'l Bank, 704 So. 2d 1020, 1028 (Miss. 1997) held that a tort
creditor could reach interests in a spendthrift trust. In response, the Mississippi legislature
enacted MIss. CODE ANN. § 91-9-503 (2004), which provides that an interest subject to a
spendthrift clause "may not be transferred and is not subject to the enforcement of a money
judgment until paid to the beneficiary." For criticism of the Sligh case, see Charles D. Fox
IV & Michael J. Huft, Asset Protectionand Dynasty Trusts, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 287,
351 (2002) (noting that"the decision could herald a significant erosion of the spendthrift trust
doctrine"); Charles D. Fox, IV & Rosalie Murphy, Are Spendthrift Trusts Vulnerable to a
Beneficiary's Tort Creditors?,TR. & EST., Feb. 1998, at 57, 60 (doubting "existence of public
policy exception" to spendthrift provisions as cited by Sligh court).
"9 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 18 (2003) (discussing secret trusts and
consequences of trustee's failure to perform).
'm Evidence of the reaction that the drafting committee could have expected is the
response of a Michigan estate planning practitioner to Sligh. For further discussion of this
case, see supra note 98. He wrote: "The Mississippi Supreme Court abused basic trust,
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case, the alternative of adding tort creditors to the list of preferred
creditors also has the effect of curtailing further judicial
development because, although it expands the list of preferred
creditors, it remains a finite list.
A third available approach would have been to adopt the
spendthrift trust doctrine except when a creditor or assignee could
show that the doctrine would lead to an unconscionable result. The
primary advantage of this third approach is that it leaves room for
judicial development while acknowledging by statute the spendthrift
trust doctrine and the intent-furthering tradition it embodies. In
Rose's terms, this would be a muddy codification of the common
law. T1 ' The Uniform Commercial Code's use of an unconscionability
test in § 2-302 provides an apt analogy.'0 2 In contract law, it has
resulted in what one might call (borrowing John Rawls's term) a
form of "reflective equilibrium," in this case meaning a normdevelopmental process going back and forth over time between
legislatures and courts.0 " A similar approach has the potential to

property and contract law by creating a common law exception to the spendthrift doctrine for
a beneficiary who engages in gross negligence and intentional torts." Allan J. Claypool, Asset
Protection Overview: Techniques in the United States and Offshore, 24 ACTEC NOTES 302,
312 (1999).
Although it decided not to expand on the traditional list of preferred creditors, that
does not mean that the committee consistently deferred to the pressures to limit intentdefeating rules. When the drafting committee decided to codify the common law rule that
prevents settlors from having protection from their creditors through the establishment of
a trust, it decided that the public policy arguments outweighed the risk that the UTC would
not gain the support of the trust bar. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505 cmt. (amended 2005). It also
decided not to create a rule of construction that would treat all trusts as spendthrift trusts
unless the instrument or surrounding circumstances indicated that the settlor did not intend
to restrain the voluntary or involuntary alienation of beneficial interests. Although a default
rule in favor of spendthrift trusts would probably further the intent of many settlors, the
drafting committee determined that, given the public policy arguments against the doctrine,
it should only permit, and not encourage, the creation of spendthrift trusts.
101 See Rose, supra note 96, at 578-79.
102 U.C.C. § 2-302 (amended 2003). For examples of scholarly discussion of the doctrine
of unconscionability in contract law, see generally Richard Craswell, Property Rules and
Liability Rules in UnonscionabilityandRelated Doctrines,60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1993) (using
distinction between property rules and liability rules in developing criteria for deciding
questions of unconscionability in contract law); Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths
About Unconscionability: A New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
1 (1981) (developing framework that relies on common law doctrines, such as duress and
undue influence, but leaving room for "pure unconscionability" cases).
103 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20, 48-51 (1971) (discussing the method of
reflective equilibrium). See generallyAlan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The PoliticalEconomy
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enhance the future development of the law of trusts and the
spendthrift trust doctrine in particular. Of course, it is entirely
possible that this approach would have met considerable resistance
because it also undermines the settlor's power to control the
disposition of interests in trust.
B. CODIFICATION

AND

MODIFICATION

OF

THE

RULE

AGAINST

PERPETUITIES

The RAP, with its internal logic, provided legal certainty as to the
validity or invalidity of a future interest at its creation and,
therefore, easily qualifies as a crystal rule. Nevertheless, difficulty
in its application (law students, lawyers, and courts have struggled
as they have tried to determine whether a particular disposition
violated the RAP) led to the RAP taking on the attributes of a
muddy rule.' °4 Over time, the RAP no longer commanded the

of PrivateLegislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995) (investigating structure of ALI and
NCCUSL generally and, in particular, considering influences that lead ALI or NCCUSL to
adopt rules rather than standards).
104 In a malpractice suit against the drafting attorney for his drafting a trust provision
violating the RAP, the court in Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 987 (1962), held that the attorney was not liable, stating:
Of the California law on perpetuities and restraints it has been said that
few, if any, areas of the law have been fraught with more confusion or
concealed traps for the unwary draftsman ....
In view of the state of the law relating to perpetuities and restraints on
alienation [which included confusing California legislation pertaining to
perpetuities] and the nature of the error, if any, assertedly made by
defendant in preparing the instrument, it would not be proper to hold that
defendant failed to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of
ordinary skill and capacity commonly exercise.
Id. at 690. But see Wright v. Williams, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 n.2 (Ct. App. 1975) (stating
that "Itihere is reason to doubt that the ultimate conclusion of Lucas v. Hamm is valid in
today's state of the art. Drafitmanship to avoid the rule against perpetuities seems no longer
esoteric."). The prevailing view that estate planners will and should be held to a standard of
practice that includes knowledge of the RAP generally means that estate planners should
know enough to insert effective perpetuity savings clauses:
The common-law Rule Against Perpetuities should be and for the most
part is less fearsome to practicing estate planning lawyers than it is to law
students and law graduates studying for the bar examination. This is not
because estate planning lawyers have found that the Rule becomes more
understandable with experience, but because they have discovered a
secret: They need not be greatly concerned about the technicalities of the
Rule because they use perpetuity savings clauses.
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consensus that the classical lawyers of the nineteenth century once
gave it. Agreement grew that its ruthless application interfered too
greatly with donative freedom.'0 5 USRAP muddies the RAP by
introducing wait-and-see with the opportunity for court reformation
in the event that an interest does not vest or fail within ninety
years. At the same time, however, USRAP crystallizes the law's
constraint on perpetual trusts by adopting the ninety-year period
and eliminating the need to search for measuring lives-an issue at
the center of earlier versions of the wait-and-see approach.'
USRAP made the common law RAP more accessible with its ninetyyear wait-and-see period. Crystallization, however, has not led to
an ossification of the common law as modified. In retrospect,
abolition of the RAP emerges as a risk of its statutory
crystallization, given the general hostility in estates and trusts law
for intent-defeating rules.
When first promulgated in 1986, the attack on USRAP mirrored
the attacks on UPC (1990) §§ 2-503 (harmless error) and 2-707
(survivorship imposed on all future interests in trust).
Commentators, most notably Jesse Dukeminier, charged that
USRAP, with its ninety-year wait-and-see rule, represented a
radical departure from the common law."°7 That argument did not

LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS,
TRusTs, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 19-28 (4th ed. 2006).
'05 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS, ch. 1, Introductory Note

(1983) (describing various jurisdictions' modification to Rule); W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities
in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror,65 HARV. L. REV. 721,747-48 (1952) (calling
for legislation to modify rule).
106 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (LexisNexis 2002) (adopting permissible vesting
period measured by life of persons who have "causal relationship" to vesting or failure of
interest); 1954 MASS. ACTS 337, codified at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184A, § 1 (repealed by 1989
MASS. ACTS 1114) (measuring permissible vesting period by length of one or more life estates
in persons in being at creation of interest); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(b) (West 2005)
(presupposing common law perpetuity period); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 1.3(2) (1983) (using predetermined list of lives to determine permissible vesting
period).
'o
Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities:Ninety Years in
Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1987) [hereinafter Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo].
For other articles concerning USRAP, see generally Ira Mark Bloom, PerpetuitiesRefinement:
There is an Alternative, 62 WASH. L. REV. 23 (1987); Jesse Dukeminier, Wait and See: The
CausalRelationshipPrinciple,102 L.Q. REv. 250 (1986); Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities:The
MeasuringLives, 85 COLuM. L. REV. 1648 (1985); Mary Louise Fellows, Testing Perpetuity
Reforms: A Study of PerpetuityCases 1984-89, 25 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 597 (1991); Amy
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prevail, and USRAP enjoyed a substantial number of enactments
soon after NCCUSL first promulgated it.' 08 Within a climate in
which the Rule stood as a paradigm example of a trap for the
unwary and served for many years as the punch line for jokes
among law students and law professors alike, relief from the Rule's
harshness received a generally warm reception. °9 This atmosphere
contrasts sharply with the situation surrounding UPC (1990) § 2503 in which the uniform law reformers had to overcome a mindset
of attorneys and judges that hold will execution formalities in high
regard. Similarly, it contrasts with the initial response to UPC
(1990) § 2-707-a response born of a mindset that rejects legislative
insertion, albeit only presumptive insertion, of language into trust
instruments. USRAP intended to solve a problem that everyone
recognized, whereas UPC (1990) §§ 2-503 and 2-707 intended to
solve problems that people did not perceive existed or did not
perceive as sufficiently bothersome to warrant a change in the
traditional law of estates and trusts. No one could effectively rebut
the USRAP proponents' argument that the statute provided relief
from an intent-defeating common law RAP. Opponents to UPC §§
2-503 and 2-707, however, could show how will formalities and the
common law's constructional preference for vesting were likely to be
intent-effectuating.
USRAP's initial success has not assured its long-term viability.
In 1986, only Idaho, South Dakota, and Wisconsin had either

Morris Hess, FreeingProperty Owners from the RAP Trap: Tennessee Adopts the Uniform
StatutoryRule Against Perpetuities,62 TENN. L. REV. 267 (1995); Ronald C. Link & Kimberly
A. Licata, Perpetuities Reform in North Carolina: The Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities,Nondonative Transfers, and Honorary Trusts, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1783 (1996);
Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The Rationale of
the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 157 (1988); Lawrence W. Waggoner,
PerpetuityReform, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1718 (1983). For more debate and reform proposals, see
T.P. Gallanis, The Future of Future Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 513, 563-74 (2003)
(arguing that duration of future interests should be unrelated to vesting and providing draft
Uniform Future Interests Act to implement this and other reforms); Paul G. Haskell, A

Proposalfor a Simple and Socially Effective Rule Against Perpetuities,66 N.C. L. REV. 545,
562 (1988) (arguing for replacement of both validating and invalidating sides of common law
Rule with statutory rule requiring vesting in possession no later than 125 years after
creation).
108 For a list of adoptions as of 2005, see Sitkoff& Schanzenbach, supranote 1, at 430-33.
109

See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ETAL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 674 (2005) (referring

to study of RAP as "the magic garden of perpetuities").
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actually or effectively abolished the Rule. By 1998, Alaska, Arizona,
Delaware, and Illinois joined the other three and, by 2005, fourteen
additional states did the same. 110 As we write, jurisdictional
competition for trust dollars through repeal of the RAP continues to
occupy the attention of banks and trust attorneys."' Just at the
moment that proponents of USRAP successfully prevailed over
attacks that the ninety-year wait-and-see approach significantly
weakened the common law Rule, they found others dismissing
USRAP and arguing for outright repeal of the RAP. As each of us
has written elsewhere, the impetus for perpetual trusts emanates
from a strong Anglo-American tradition of dead hand control and a
nearly singular focus on the rights of settlors to control beneficiaries'
enjoyment of their trust interests." 2 The RAP, in fact, stands nearly
alone as an intent-defeating common law rule that recognizes
donees as property owners who at some point (a life in being plus
twenty-one years) have the right to a transferable interest. In most
other respects, trust law in3 the United States has given way to a
settlor's dynastic impulse.1
110 Sitkoff & Schnazenbach, supra note 1, at 375-77, 430-33.

...See id. at 416-18 (finding that competition among states "has influenced the situs of
trust funds totaling roughly $100 billion").
112 Alexander, supra note 88, at 1189-90; Fellows, supra note 90; Mary Louise Fellows,
Why the Generation-SkippingTransfer Tax Sparked Perpetual Trusts, 27 CARDoZO L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006).
...Two possible counter examples are worth brief consideration. The first concerns the
Claflin doctrine, which holds that beneficiaries cannot compel a trust's premature
termination if it would defeat a material purpose of the trust. See Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E.
454,456 (Mass. 1889) (refusing to terminate trust providing for distribution on installments).
UTC § 411 codifies the common law version of that doctrine, as its comment states. UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 411 cmt. (amended 2005). Section 411(c), however, appears to relax the
original version of the doctrine with respect to one aspect of the material purpose
requirement. It provides that "[a] spendthrift provision in the terms of the trust is not
presumed to constitute a material purpose of the trust." Id. § 4 11(c). Under the common law
version of the Claflin doctrine, courts treated a spendthrift provision as a material purpose
that would prevent termination of a trust. The purpose behind subsection (c), however, was
not to defeat or inhibit the settlor's intent, but in fact to promote that intent. Lawyers
frequently insert spendthrift clauses as part of a trust's "boilerplate," with little or no
discussion with the settlor. In this context, § 41 1(c)'s reversal of the presumption represents
an effort to prompt judicial investigation of the settlor's actual intent. See id. § 411 cmt.
(calling for "some showing of a particular concern or objective" of settlor). In this sense, then,
the provision continues U.S. trust law's traditional allocation of control over the trust to the
settlor rather than to the beneficiaries. It is worth noting, however, that the Restatement
(Third)of Trusts does substantially revise the Claflindoctrine. Section 65 of the Restatement
provides that the court may authorize premature trust termination "if it determines that the
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In recent years, competitive considerations have played an
increasing role in the profession of estate planning. Within this
environment, when federal transfer tax law, through the generationskipping transfer (GST) tax exemption, invited the creation of
dynastic trusts, the RAP, even in its more benign USRAP form,
looked more like an unwarranted impediment to trust business for
estate planners and institutional trustees, and less like a statement
of good public policy." 4 The GST tax rules, which, when enacted in
1986, allowed settlors to exempt up to $1 million from the GST tax
and, as of 2006, allows them to exempt up to $2 million, created a
considerable incentive for settlors to establish dynastic trusts." 5 In
accordance with the GST tax, once a settlor creates a GST taxexempt trust, the trust beneficiaries do not have to pay any federal
transfer taxes on their interests that remain in trust, regardless of
how much it appreciates or how long it remains in trust. When

reason for termination outweighs the material purpose." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 15 (2005). The comment goes on to state that neither spendthrift provisions nor
discretionary provisions create a presumption that the trust is a material purpose trust. Id.
at cmt. e.
The second possible counter-example to the deference accorded settlors is the UTC's
codification of the "benefit-the-beneficiaries" principle in § 404, which states that a "trust and
its terms must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries." The provision may appear to dislodge
the central role of the settlor under trust law doctrine. The commentary to UTC § 404,
however, considerably limits its breadth by first acknowledging that the "settlor has
considerable latitude in specifying how a particular trust purpose is to be pursued," and then
referring only to "administrative and other nondispositive trust terms" when applying the test
that the trust terms must "reasonably relate" to a trust's purpose "and not divert the trust
property to achieve a trust purpose that is invalid, such as one which is frivolous or
capricious." UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 cmt. (amended 2005). The commentary goes on to refer
to UTC § 412(b), which provides that, even if a settlor has anticipated the change in
circumstances that have occurred, a court may modify a trust's administrative terms, such
as investment directions, if they become "impracticable or wasteful or impair the trust's
administration." Within the framework of the UTC, the "benefit-the-beneficiaries" doctrine
essentially is a "change-of-circumstances doctrine" limited to administrative provisions. Id.
99 404 cmt., 412(b) cmt.; John H. Langbein, MandatoryRules in the Law of Trusts, 98 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1105, 1110-11, 1119 (2004).
The respect for a settlor's dynastic impulse in the United States explains the
fundamental difference between the trust law in the United States and England. Alexander,
supra note 88, at 1192 n.8; see also Paul Matthews, The ComparativeImportanceof the Rule
in Saunders v. Vautier, 122 LAwQ. REV. 266,280-92 (2006) (comparingU.S. approach to trust
law and England's in light of changes to perpetuity rules); Robert H. Sitkoff,An Agency Costs
Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 658-63 (2004) (discussing Claflin doctrine).
114 Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 1, at 360 n.4.
"5 I.R.C. § 2010(c) (Supp. HI 2003); id. § 2631(c) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
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Congress enacted the GST tax, neither they nor the experts who
testified before them seemed to have contemplated an estate
planning world without the RAP."' With full recognition that banks
and estate planners would conduct a heavy marketing campaign
promoting GST tax-exempt trusts, everyone agreed that the
generous, and, for some, significantly flawed, GST tax exemption
n7
had an end point-the RAP or its statutory counterpart, USRAP.

As Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff have shown
through empirical analysis of data assembled from annual reports
to federal banking authorities by institutional trustees, the "GST
tax sparked the movement to abolish the Rule and the rise of the
perpetual trust.""' Without question, the GST tax has played a
central role in engendering enthusiasm for repeal of the RAP and
USRAP. Nevertheless, it remains important to recognize that it
only can play that role in an environment receptive to perpetual
trusts-the GST tax spark fell on dry tinder."9 That environment
includes the tradition of dead hand control and the growth in the
commerce of estate planning.
Paradoxically, as a result of the clarity produced by the ninetyyear wait-and-see rule, USRAP itself also may be contributing
inadvertently to the estate planning environment that supports
perpetual trusts. Dukeminier came close to predicting as much
when he wrote, "[the] Uniform Statute is a radical remedy for what
ails the Rule against Perpetuities. It is a long step towards

"6 STAFF OFJ. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE

AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 394 (Comm. Print 2005), availableat http//www.house.gov/
jet/s-2-05.pdf; Generation-SkippingTransferTax: HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means, 98th Cong. 335,336 (1984) (statement of Raymond H. Young, Chairman, GenerationSkipping Transfer Tax Subcommittee, Boston Bar Association) [hereinafter Young

Testimony].
117 See Young Testimony, supra note 116, at 336, 338; see also Jesse Dukeminier, The
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuitiesand the GST Tax: New Perilsfor Practitioners
and New Opportunities, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 185 passim (1995) (discussing
interaction of RAP, USRAP, and GST tax grandparenting provisions); Dukeminier & Krier,
supra note 1, at 1313 (stating that Congress "probably assumed that most states would

continue to adhere to the Rule against Perpetuities in one or another variation, but this has
proved unfounded").
11' See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuitiesof Taxes: Explaining the
Rise of the PerpetualTrust, 27 CARDozO L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).

9 Fellows, supra note 112 (analyzing components that make up "dry tinder").
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abolishing the Rule against Perpetuities itself."2 °
Where
Dukeminier was wrong, however, was in his belief that the Rule
would die because it could not "survive 90 years of desuetude." 2 '
With the widespread adoption of USRAP, the Rule lost its

mystique-a mystique based on the view that the Rule had its own
internal logic of legal certainty. Without that mystique, proponents
of some limitation on dynastic trusts would no longer be able to rely
on common law traditions that honor formalism.'2 2 Lewis M. Simes
in his attack on wait-and-see in the 1950s perhaps came closest to
capturing this idea when he wrote that "[i]f the 'wait-and-see'
doctrine is generally adopted ... the common law rule against
perpetuities, in anything like the form in which we know it, will
cease to exist."'2 3 Arguably, on the strength of the GST tax
exemption alone, the movement to abolish the Rule (as applied to
trusts) would have occurred. Yet, the promulgation of the USRAP,
which stripped the Rule of its mystique, also may have made it
easier for bankers and trust attorneys to move toward perpetual
trusts.

120
121

Dukeminier, Ninety Years in Limbo, supra note 107, at 1024.
Id. at 1026. Ultimately, writing with Krier, Dukeminier did not attribute the abolition

movement to USRAP at all, but to the GST tax exemption and jurisdictional competition:
The reason [why states are permitting perpetual trusts] has little if
anything to do with some wish on the part of wealthy people to control the
lives of their unknown descendants; rather, it has to do with their interest
in saving on federal transfer taxes imposed at the descendants' deaths,
and on competition among the states to cater to that interest.
Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 1, at 1314-15.
122 Dukeminier and Krier made a similar point:
INlotwithstanding that ninety years might equal the period one could
accomplish under the Rule, ninety is on its face a number and not a
principle. The drafters of USRAP, no doubt unintentionally, made an
arguably damaging reductionist move. To reduce matters to "ninety
years" is to obscure the purposes of restrictions on dead-had control,
especially in the minds of those people (which is to say just about
everybody) who do not quite understand control of perpetuities in the first
place. USRAP makes a mere number the salient thing, the topic of
debates, the target of reforms, the subject of marginal
alterations--extensions by a few years, by a few decades, by a couple of
centuries or so.
Id. at 1310.
"2 Lewis M. Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The 'Wait and See"
Doctrine, 52 MICH. L. REV. 179, 190 (1953).

1084

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1049

USRAP remains the best and most workable statutory reform
proposal addressing the problems caused by the operation of the
common law Rule. The problem facing uniform law reformers in the
case of USRAP is explaining convincingly why the underlying
purpose of the intent-defeating RAP has continuing relevance. Time
will tell whether USRAP will retain its current dominance in the
United States. If, as the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation
has proposed, Congress amends the law to eliminate the generationskipping tax advantages of perpetual trusts, the current interest in
The interest may also subside if
such trusts may subside.'
Congress permanently repeals the federal estate tax and the GST
tax.'25 Either event may lessen the pressure for abolition of the RAP
and repeal of USRAP.
With interest in perpetual trusts having been sparked by
Congress, however, one wonders whether the stakeholders in the
business of estate planning will continue to find reasons to promote
the continuation of existing trusts and create more of them.
Notably, Schanzenbach and Sitkoff seem to raise an alarm about
They indicate that liberal rules of trust
perpetual trusts.
modification and termination, along with trust provisions allowing
each generation of beneficiaries to decide to continue the trust or
bring it to an end through the exercise of nongeneral powers of
appointment, are necessary to control the potential problems that
Whether these tools will prove
perpetual trusts create.'2 6
sufficiently robust to address anticipated and unanticipated
problems remains uncertain. In any case, the need for estate
planners to rely on these anti-perpetuity mechanisms suggests that
even the most ardent supporters of perpetuity trusts actually may
have concerns about settlors' retaining control over their property
for centuries upon centuries. If that is true, this is yet another
reason to predict that the current quest for perpetuity trusts may

'7A See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 116, at 392-95 (proposing limitation
of one generation skip to avoid "perpetual dynasty trust").
"2 See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§§ 501, 901, 115 STAT. 38, 69, 150 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.) (repealing
estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes after December 31, 2009 and reinstating those
taxes after December 31, 2010).
"6 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 118.
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wane. In other words, in the long run, USRAP may garner broad
support as the most appropriate approach for balancing the donative
freedom of the current generation and the donative freedom of
future generations.
V. CONCLUSION

Statutory reform has made and will continue to make the law of
estates and trusts simpler, fairer, and less expensive. As law
reformers, and NCCUSL especially, go forward to build on Richard
Wellman's legacy, we urge them to remain mindful of the last forty
years of legal change. That history teaches four important lessons.
First, they need to appreciate the residual power of schemata and
evaluate whether and how they can disrupt these mental images to
assure the full potential of the proposed statutory reform. Second,
they need to appreciate that the reception of new rules of
construction depends on whether a consensus among estates and
trusts experts emerges that the current law fails to further donative
intent. Third, law reformers must proceed most cautiously when
dealing with intent-defeating common law rules. Crystallization of
an intent-defeating rule can stunt further doctrinal development to
enhance the rule's potency, or it can lead to further statutory change
that will undermine its effectiveness. Given the intent-furthering
traditions of estates and trusts law, codification of intent-defeating
rules risks establishing a one-way path in which pressure will build
solely to ratchet down the rule's vitality or even to eliminate it
completely. Fourth, law reformers should not shy away from
legislative reform merely because it may not garner significant
support at the outset. Legislative reform often takes an extended
period of time to gain acceptance. In the estates and trusts field,
continuing and persistent efforts are necessary to overcome the
residual force of traditional schemata and the deference to the
language of governing instruments. These four lessons together
hold the promise that the modern law of estates and trusts will
follow Richard Wellman's wise lead and remain responsive to the
needs of every state's citizenry.

